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SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ARE
NOT "OK": WHY OKLAHOMA NEEDS TO AMEND
THE SEX OFFENDERS REGISTRATION ACT
Sex offenders are a serious threat to this country and most of their victims are
children.1 Upon release from prison, convicted sex offenders are more likely than other
convicted felons to be rearrested for a sex crime. 2 It only makes sense that families do
not want a convicted sex offender living next door, and legislators have responded by
implementing "not-in-my-backyard ' 3 laws in an attempt to control where sex offenders
can legally reside.4  Such legislation is growing rapidly at both the state and federal
,6level, 5 but in reality, this legislation provides "a false sense of security." These laws
have backfired, and instead of protecting the public, the laws cause sex offenders to go
underground by either not registering or by providing fake addresses.7  The
implementation of residency restrictions and prohibition against sex offenders residing
within a certain distance of schools, child care facilities, parks, and other places children
congregate, 8 contributes to these registration problems.
9
Oklahoma has followed the legislative trend of strengthening residence restrictions
against sex offenders through a series of amendments to its Sex Offenders Registration
Act. After expanding residence restrictions in 2006, many Oklahoma jurisdictions saw
1. Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002)
(plurality)); see also Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and
Sexual Assault iii (U.S. Dept of Just. Feb. 1997) (available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf)
(Self-reports from convicted sex offenders indicated two-thirds had victims under the age of 18, and 58 percent
of those offenders indicated the victims were age 12 and under.); Howard N. Snyder, Sexual Assault of Young
Children as Reported to Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics 2 tbl. I (U.S. Dept.
of Just. Jul. 2000) (available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf) (Victims age 17 and under
account for 66.9 percent of all sexual assaults.).
2. Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R. Durose, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from
Prison in 1994, U.S. Dept. of Just. 1-2, 24 tbl. 21 (Nov. 2003) (available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf) (Within three years from release, 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for a sex
crime, in comparison to only 1.3 percent of non-sex offenders; within three years from release, 3.5 percent of
sex offenders were reconvicted.).
3. Jill Smolowe, Not in My Backyard! 144 Time 59 (Sept. 5, 1994).
4. Wendy Koch, Sex-Offender Residency Laws Get Second Look, USA Today IA (Feb. 26, 2007)
(available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-25-sex-offender-laws-cover-x.htm).
5. Alan Greenblatt, Sex Offenders, 16 CQ Researcher 721, 735 (Sept. 8, 2006).
6. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 Iowa L.
Rev. 1, 19 (2006).
7. Koch, supra n. 4.
8. Id.; Marcus Nieto & David Jung, The Impact of Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders and
Correctional Management Practices: A Literature Review 17 tbl. 2 (Calif. Research Bureau Aug. 2006)
(available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/O6/08/06-008.pdf).
9. Infra pts. I(C) & IV (discussing a decrease in sex-offender registrations after restrictions were
implemented).
1
Thoreson: Sex Offender Residency Restrictions Are Not OK: Why Oklahoma Need
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008
TULSA LAW REVIEW
an increase in the number of lost offenders.' 0 In 2007, the Oklahoma Legislature again
amended the state's Sex Offenders Registration Act.11 These amendments purportedly
require the Department of Corrections to assess sex offenders on an individual basis by
looking at various factors and then assigning sex offenders to one of three risk levels.
12
As implemented, however, the convicted offense is the sole determining factor in
assigning risk levels and other, more important, factors are not taken into
consideration. 13
This Comment examines the 2007 amendments adding risk levels to Oklahoma's
Sex Offenders Registration Act, the state's residency restrictions, and how the law can be
improved. In particular, this Comment argues that in determining a registered sex
offender's numeric risk level, Oklahoma should use individualized risk assessments that
take into consideration multiple factors instead of relying solely on the offense. Based
on these individualized assessments, Level One sex offenders should not be subjected to
the residency restrictions because they pose a low danger to the community and are not
likely to engage in further criminal sexual conduct. This Comment proceeds in five
parts. Part I provides a history of how sex offender registration and notification laws and
residency restrictions have evolved over time on both the federal level and the states'
various implementations. Part II examines how the sex offender registration and
notification laws have withstood challenges to the Supreme Court. Part III examines
challenges to sex offender residency restrictions. Part IV looks at whether residency
restrictions are effective in preventing future sex crimes. Finally, Part V argues that
Oklahoma should use individualized risk assessments that consider multiple factors to
increase the accuracy in determining a sex offender's risk level. The risk levels should
then be tied to the residency restrictions and only those offenders that are truly a threat to
the public should be subject to a residency restriction.
I. LEGISLATION TARGETING SEX OFFENDERS
Legislators do not want to appear soft on crime, particularly sex crimes. 14  In
response to fear and pressure from the media and the public, lawmakers quickly pass
legislation without full consideration of the necessity and effectiveness of the new
laws. 1 5 Recently, the enactment of sex offender legislation is at a faster pace than ever
before. 16  Although well intentioned, some of the laws targeting sex offenders may
10. See e.g. Mick Hinton, Fixing Sex-Offender Law May Give Senators Pause, Tulsa World A-9, A-14
(May 16, 2007) (Tulsa saw a decrease in registration but an increase in caseload trying to find where offenders
live.).
11. Okla. H. 1760, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 17, 2007) (available at http://webserverl.Isb.state.ok.us/2007-
08HB/HB1760_int.rtf) (effective Nov. 1, 2007).
12. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, §§ 582.1, 582.5(C)(Supp. 2007).
13. Infra pt. V (discussing the statute and the screening tool selected by the risk assessment review
committee).
14. See Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 724 (Lawmakers "either vot[e] for the perverts or vot[e] for [their]
constituen[ts]." (quoting Ga. St. Rep. John Lunsford)); Hinton, supra n. 10, at A-14 (explaining that state
legislators fear votes could be used against them in elections).
15. David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The Case for More
Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 600, 625 (2006).
16. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 735.
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actually undermine public safety.' 
7
A. Registration and Notification Laws
In 1947, California was the first state in the country to enact a sex offender
registration statute. 18 However, it was not until the 1990s, with national publicity from a
handful of shocking kidnappings, sexual assaults, and murders resulting in federal
legislation, that other states followed suit. 
19
On an October evening in 1989, 1 1-year-old Jacob Wetterling was riding his bike
home from a convenience store in St. Joseph, Minnesota with his 10-year-old brother
Trevor and their 11-year-old friend Aaron when a masked man carrying a gun
approached. 20 The gunman ordered the boys to throw their bikes into a ditch and lie face
down on the ground; the gunman proceeded to ask each boy his age.2 1 After the boys
answered, the man ordered Trevor, and then Aaron, to run away without looking back
and threatened to shoot them. 22 As the boys ran towards the woods, they looked back
and saw the gunman grab Jacob's arm.23 When the boys reached the trees, they looked
back again, but this time, Jacob and the gunman were gone, and Jacob has never been
found.
24
Following Jacob's abduction, investigators discovered that, unknown to local law
enforcement, there were halfway houses for sex offenders in the area.25 Jacob's mother,
Patty, became involved with the Governor's Task Force advocating for stronger sex
offender registration requirements. 26  In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Act
27 in memory of Jacob. 28
The Jacob Wetterling Act mandated all states to implement a sex offender registry within
three years of its enactment. 29  The length of registration required ranges from a
minimum of 10 years to a potential maximum period of registering for life for certain
offenders. 30  Prior to the passage of this Act, only a handful of states required sex
offenders to register, but today, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have sex
17. See id. at 724.
18. Cal. Dept. Just., Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion Information, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/
sexreg.aspx?lang=ENGLISH (accessed May 23, 2009).
19. See Karen J. Terry, Sexual Offenses and Offenders: Theory, Practice, and Policy 183-84 (Thomson
Wadsworth 2006); Karen J. Terry & John S. Furlong, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification I-
2 (2d ed., Civic Research Inst. 2003).
20. Margaret C. Jasper, Missing and Exploited Children: How to Protect Your Child II (Oceana's Leg.
Almanac Series: L. for Layperson, Oxford U. Press 2006); Jacob Wetterling Resource Ctr., Jacob's Story,
http://www.jwrc.org/who-we-are/history/jacob's-story.aspx (accessed May 23, 2009).




25. Bureau Just. Assistance, Background Information on the Act and Its Amendments,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlBJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html (accessed May 23, 2009).
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
28. Jasper, supra n. 20, at 12.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(1). States that fail to comply with the registration program lose 10 percent of
their federal funding for law enforcement. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(1)-(2).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6) (lifetime registration required for sexually violent predators, recidivists, and
offenders who commit certain aggravated offenses).
3
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It soon became apparent that registration alone was inadequate protection. In
1994, Jesse Timmendequas, a twice-convicted pedophile and registered sex offender,
lured his seven-year-old neighbor, Megan Kanka, into his home and raped and murdered
her.32 Had Megan's parents known a sex offender lived across the street, they would
have been more vigilant and could have taken greater precautions to protect her. 33 In
1996, in response to this tragedy, the impetus for further public protection and prevention
of recidivism at the federal level resulted in legislators passing Megan's Law,34 which
amended the Jacob Wetterling Act and required all states to develop a community
notification program by providing public access to sex offender information through the
maintenance of sex offender websites.35  Any community notification beyond the
required internet sites is left to each state's discretion.
36
Although all states have implemented Megan's Law, the laws vary from state to
state and there is little uniformity. 37 One of the differences between states is the type of
offense triggering registration. 38  Some states require registration only if the offense
involved a child victim; other states require registration only for convictions of a
completed offense, while others require registration for a finding of not guilty by reason
of insanity.3 9  Another common difference is how the registration statutes apply to
juvenile offenders. Most states require juveniles to register, but there are many states
that exempt juveniles from the registration requirement, and in other states, juveniles are
required to register only if over a certain age.
4 1
The number of offenders registered in each state also depends on whether the state
applies the registration requirement retroactively, requiring offenders to register even if
the offense was committed prior to the statute's enactment. 42 Courts have consistently
upheld retroactive registration requirements although a few have struck down retroactive
notification statutes as unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds.43 The trend, however,
is for courts to uphold the retroactive notification statutes.44 Another difference between
31. Terry & Furlong, supra n. 19, at 1-2; Natl. Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Sex-Offenders:
History, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServletLanguageCountry-en-US&Pageld =
3032 (accessed May 23, 2009).
32. Karen Terry & B.J. Cling, Megan's Law: New Protections against Sex Abuse, in Sexualized Violence
against Women and Children: A Psychology and Law Perspective 245, 251 (B.J. Cling ed., Guilford Press
2004).
33. Jasper, supra n. 20, at 13.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e).
35. Jasper, supra n. 20, at 13; Ntl. Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra n. 31. To search the
national sex offender website, see U.S. Dept. Just., Dru Sodin National Sex Offender Public Website,
http://www.nsopr.gov/ (accessed May 23, 2009). For a listing of each states's sex offender registry website,
see FBI, Crimes against Children, National/State Sex Offender Registry, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/
registry.htm (accessed May 23, 2009).
36. Ntl. Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra n. 31.
37. Terry, supran. 19, at 184.
38. Id. at 184.
39. ld. at 184, 189.
40. Id. at 190-91.
41. Id. at 190.
42. Terry, supra n. 19, at 189.
43. Terry & Furlong, supra n. 19, at 1-21 to 1-22.
44. Id. at 1-22 to 1-23.
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states is the length of time an offender is required to register; some states require lifetime
registration for all offenders, and other states allow for removal from the registry after a
period of time, typically a minimum of at least 10 years.
45
Another recent movement in sex offender legislation is to increase sentencing,
impose mandatory minimums, and provide for more stringent monitoring of convicted
sex offenders.46  This legislation, commonly referred to as Jessica's Law,4 7 was in
response to the abduction, rape, and murder of 9-year-old Jessica Lunsford by a
convicted sex offender. 48 In 2005, Florida was the first state to pass the Jessica Lunsford
Act, 49 and 33 states have now enacted the same or similar versions.50  In addition to
increasing the length of sentences, some states now provide the death penalty for repeat
offenders with child victims.
5 1
Due to the significant differences between states, President George W. Bush
signed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 200652 into law to help
strengthen efforts to protect children from sexual predators. 5
3 Exactly 25 years earlier, 54
six-year-old Adam Walsh 55 was shopping with his mother in a Florida department store,
and while she looked at lamps, he was abducted.56 Over two weeks later, Adam's body
was found, and his murder was finally solved in December 2008.
57
The Adam Walsh Act was designed to strengthen existing laws in four significant
ways: first, it creates a national sex offender registry available to the public on the
Internet; 58 second, it mandates stricter penalties for certain offenses;59 third, it creates
new taskforces to help protect children from sexual exploitation on the Internet;60 and
fourth, it creates a national child abuse registry and requires investigators to conduct
background checks of adoptive and foster parents. 6 1  States have three years to
implement the changes or risk forfeiting 10 percent of federal law enforcement
funding.62  Once all states are in compliance, there will be more uniformity in sex
45. Id. at 1-10; Terry, supra n. 19, at 185-89.
46. Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 12-13.
47. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 723.
48. Id.
49. 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 2005-28; Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 12.
50. Jessica Marie Lunsford Found., http://www.jmlfoundation.com (accessed May 23, 2008).
51. Lori Robertson, States Aim to Stop Sex Offenders: Will New Laws Keep Children Safe? Children's Beat
6, 6 (Fall/Winter 2006).
52. Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 1, 120 Stat. 587, 587 (2006).
53. White House: Pres. George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.htmi (July 2006)
[hereinafter White House].
54. George W. Bush, Speech, President Signs H.R. 4472, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006 (Washington D.C., July 27, 2006) (available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news
releases/2006/07/20060727-6.html); Am.'s Most Wanted, About John Walsh, http://www.amw.com/ about_
amw/john walsh.cfm (accessed May 23, 2009).
55. Adam's father, John Walsh, has become a victims' advocate and hosts the television show "America's
Most Wanted." Am.'s Most Wanted, supra n. 54.
56. Jasper, supra n. 20, at 21.
57. Id.; Am.'s Most Wanted, supra n. 54.
58. 120 Stat. at 596; White House, supra n. 53.
59. 120 Stat. at 596-97; White House, supra n. 53.
60. 120 Stat. at 596-97; White House, supra n. 53.
61. 120 Stat. at 596-97; White House, supra n. 53.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16924(a), 16925(a) (2006).
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offender registries, with the hope that fewer sex offenders will slip through the cracks.
63
B. Sex Offender Classification
Most significantly, the Adam Walsh Act classifies sex offenders into three tiers,
based on the severity and any recurrence of the offense(s), with tier III being the most
serious. 64 The length of required registration as a sex offender correlates to the tier
classification; a tier III offender is required to register for life, a tier II offender must
register for 25 years, and a tier I offender must register for 15 years (with a possible
reduction of five years if the offender maintains a clean record for 10 years).65 The
government's frequency of in person verification also depends on the corresponding tier:
every three months for tier III offenders, every six months for tier II offenders, and once
a year for tier I offenders.
66
Prior to the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, many states already used a tiered-
model of risk assessment for sex offenders. 67 The methods employed for assessing
offender risk vary by state. 68  There are three possible approaches to assessing
recidivism of sex offenders: pure actuarial assessments, adjusted actuarial assessments,
and guided clinical judgments.6 9 Actuarial assessments, which identify relevant risk
factors and weigh those predictive factors to come up with an aggregate risk score and
classification, 70 are the most frequently used 7 1 and are the most accurate. 72 Actuarial
assessments typically look at static, stable factors that do not change over time. 73 Those
factors include current and prior sexual offenses; victim-offender relationship; age,
number, and gender of victims; and pattern of behavior.7 4 A consideration of dynamic
factors, such as problems with intimacy, social support, coping mechanisms, unstable
lifestyles, impulse control, and substance abuse, increases the accuracy of risk
63. Nil. Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra n. 31.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006). Tier III offenses include, or are comparable to or more severe than,
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, abusive sexual conduct against a child under the age of 13,
kidnapping of a minor (excluding those committed by parents or guardians), and repeat offenses committed by
a Tier 11 offender. Id. at. § 16911(4). Tier II offenses include, or are comparable to or more severe than, the
following offenses, when committed against a minor: sex trafficking, coercion and enticement, transportation
with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, or abusive sexual contact; or offenses that involve use of a
minor in sexual performance, soliciting a minor for prostitution, or production or distribution of child
pornography; or repeat offenses committed by a Tier I offender. Id. at § 16911(3). Tier I offenders are those
other than a Tier 1I or Tier III offender. Id. at § 16911(2).
65. Id. at § 16915.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 16916(2006).
67. Terry, supran. 19, at 191.
68. Id.
69. R. Karl Hanson, Who Is Dangerous and When Are They Safe? Risk Assessment with Sexual Offenders,
in Protecting Society from Sexually Dangerous Offenders 63, 66 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds.,
Am. Psych. Assn. 2003).
70. Id.; Andrew J. Harris, Risk Assessment and Sex Offender Community Supervision: A Context-Speciic
Framework, 70 Fed. Probation 36, 38 (Sept. 2006).
71. Harris, supran. 70, at 39.
72. Id.
73. Terry, supra n. 19, at 193; Hanson, supra n. 69, at 71; Harris, supra n. 70, at 38-39. There is at least
one actuarial assessment, the SONAR (Sex Offender Needs Assessment Rating) that uses dynamic, rather than
static, factors. Id. at 39.
74. See Hanson, supra n. 69, at 66 tbl. 3.1, 68 tbl. 3.2; Terry, supra n.19, at 191; Harris, supra n. 70, at 38.
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assessments. 75  Adjusted actuarial assessments allow evaluators to adjust the risk
assessment up or down based on external factors. 76  In the guided clinical judgment
approach, professional evaluators form a general opinion of the offender's potential risk
of recidivism based on a series of empirically validated risk factors. 77 In contrast, the
Adam Walsh Act does not require individualized risk assessments of sex offenders;
classification of offenders is based solely on the type and recurrence of the offenses.
78
In 2007, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the state's Sex Offenders Registration
Act.79 The new statutes require the Department of Corrections to assess and assign sex
offenders to one of three risk levels prior to release from a correctional institution.80 In
the case of an offender who is not incarcerated but receives a suspended sentence or any
probationary term, the court, instead of the Department of Corrections, must make a
determination of the numeric risk level on the day of pronouncing the judgment and
sentence. 8 1 The numeric risk level is determined by using an objective sex offender
screening tool82 that assigns points solely based on the convicted offense.8 3 A rating of
level three indicates the offender will likely continue to engage in criminal sexual
conduct and poses a serious threat to the community. 84 Offenders with a rating level of
two may continue engaging in criminal sexual conduct and pose a moderate threat to the
community. 85 A rating of level one indicates the offender is not likely to re-offend and
poses a low threat to the community.
86
In compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, Oklahoma's numeric risk level assigned
to each offender dictates the length of time the offender is required to register, which
begins from the date of the sentence completion. 87 Habitual or aggravated sex offenders
and Level Three offenders are required to register for life; Level Two offenders are
required to register for 25 years; Level One offenders are required to register for 15 years
(with the possibility of a five year reduction for maintaining a clean record). 88  The
frequency of address verification is also dependent upon the risk level. 89
75. Hanson, supra n. 70, at 71.
76. Id. at 67.
77. Id. at 66.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 16911. See also id. at § 1407 1(a)(3)(C) (defining "sexually violent predator").
79. Okla. H. 1760, 51st Leg., 1st Sess.
80. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.1.
81. Id. at § 582.2(B).
82. The Department of Corrections' Risk Assessment Review Committee is responsible for developing or
selecting the screening tool, monitoring the use of the tool, and, if necessary, revising and replacing the
screening tool. Id. at § 582.5.
83. Okla. Dept. Corrects., Sex Offender Registration Level Assignment Tool (available at
www.doc.state.ok.us/offtech/020307e.pdf). But see Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C) (the screening tool should
assign points for various "factors," with the convicted offense serving only as the minimum basis (emphasis
added)).
84. Okla. Star. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(3).
85. Id. at § 582.5(C)(2).
86. Id. at § 582.5(C)(1).
87. Id. at § 583(C) (Supp. 2007).
88. Id. at § 583(C), (E). Prior to this amendment, habitual or aggravated sex offenders were required to
register for life, and all other sex offenders were required to register for 10 years. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, §§ 583(C),
584(J) (Supp. 2006) (superseded Nov. 1, 2007).
89. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 584(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
7
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C. Residency Restrictions
In 1995, Florida became the first state to implement residence restrictions upon sex
offenders.9° Other states followed suit, and by the end of 1999, seven states had enacted
residency restrictions. 9 1  This trend continued to grow and today 27 states have
implemented residency restrictions in various degrees. 92  Sometimes referred to as
"distance marker" laws,93 the most common restrictions 94 were modeled after traditional
nuisance codes 95 and prohibit sex offenders from residing within 500 feet, but more
typically within 1,000 to 2,000 feet, of schools, child care facilities, parks, and other
places children gather.
96
In the last few years, city and county governments also began implementing
residency restrictions to create "sex offender free" communities. 97  Hundreds of
municipalities now have their own sex offender residency restrictions98 and in many
cases, these restrictions are more severe than those at the state level.99  Even private
housing developers have begun forbidding registered sex offenders from living in certain
neighborhoods.100 The trend has become contagious as more states and communities
attempt to discourage displaced sex offenders from moving into their areas. 10 1  The
domino effect is intentional, as lawmakers attempt to push the problem off onto other
communities. 10 2 Although the list of jurisdictions implementing residency restrictions
90. Jill S. Levenson, Residence Restrictions and Their Impact on Sex Offender Reintegration,
Rehabilitation, and Recidivism 2 (2007) (available at www.csom.org/ref/residencerestrictions.pdf); Singleton,
supra n. 15, at 609 n. 86.
91. Singleton, supra n. 15, at 607.
92. Koch, supra n. 4.
93. Meghan Stromberg, Locked up, Then Locked out, Planning 21, 23 (Jan. 2007); Nieto & Jung, supra n.
8, at 15.
94. In addition to "Distance Marker" laws, some states have "Child Safety Zone" restrictions that forbid sex
offenders from loitering within a certain distance of where children congregate, such as day care centers,
schools, bus stops, and playgrounds. Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 15.
95. Stromberg, supra n. 93, at 23; see also Levenson, supra n. 90, at 2.
96. Koch, supra n. 4; Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 17 tbl. 2. The restricted areas are usually measured
property line to property line. Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and
Employment Restrictions, 40 Akron L. Rev. 339, 352 (2007).
97. Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 21-23; Singleton, supra n. 15, at 609.
98. Jill S. Levenson & David A. D'Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual Violence: The
Emperor's New Clothes? 18 Crim. Just. Policy Rev. 168, 172 (2007); Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 3;
Stromberg, supra n. 93, at 22.
99. See e.g. Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hem, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Unintended
Consequences and Community Reentry, 9 Just. Research & Policy 59, 60 (2007) (ordinances increase restricted
zones to 2,500 feet); Megan MeCurdy, Case Note, Doe v. Miller, 38 Urb. Law. 360, 361 (ordinances extending
restricted areas to include swimming pools, libraries, parks, and multi-recreational trails); Nieto & Jung, supra
n. 8, at 21-23; Robert F. Worth, Exiling Sex Offenders from Town: Questions about Legality and Effectiveness,
155 N.Y. Times B 1 (Oct. 3, 2005) (sex offenders banned from public hurricane shelters).
100. Wendy Koch, Developments Bar Sex Offenders, USA Today 3A (Jun. 16, 2006) (available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-06-15-sex-offenders-barred-x.htm) (sex offenders barred from
subdivision; if convicted while living in the neighborhood, the offender has to pay a $1,500 per day fine);
Levenson & D'Amora, supra n. 98, at 173.
101. Levenson & D'Amora, supra n. 98, at 173.
102. Id.; Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the State of
Georgia: A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 Har. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 513, 516 (2007) (quoting Ga.
State Rep. Jerry Keen, "[W]e don't want these types of people staying in our state.... [W]e are going to send
a message to [those types of people] that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps you need to move to
another state.... [T]hey just may want to live somewhere else .... And I don't care where, as long as it's not
in Georgia."' (footnotes omitted)); Levenson, supra n. 90, at 2.
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keeps growing, there are some that choose not to follow suit. 103 As will be discussed in
Part IV, there are doubts as to the effectiveness of the statutes. 1
04
The differences found among jurisdictions implementing residency restrictions are
similar to the differences found in comparing sex offender registration and notification
statutes. The restrictions do not always apply to all registered sex offenders; several
states exclude from the zones only high-risk, violent, or repeat offenders; offenders with
child victims; or those on parole. 105 Juvenile offenders are also sometimes exempt from
residency restrictions. 10 6  Some, but not all, of the laws provide exemptions for sex
offenders who resided within the restricted areas prior to enactment. 107 However, most
of those exemptions apply only to offenders who owned their homes within the restricted
zones and not to renters or boarders. 10 8 The most restrictive residency restrictions
prevent sex offenders from residing not only near schools, child care facilities, and parks,
but include areas near community and recreational centers, places of worship, libraries,
and bus stops. 109 As a result of these restrictions, sex offenders are excluded from the
majority of available housing in many cities, and in some circumstances, entire towns are
off-limits. 110  Sex offenders who fail to comply with the residency restrictions can be
convicted of a felony.
1
'
In 2003, Oklahoma followed the trend of implementing residency restrictions on
sex offenders and forbade registered sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of any
school or educational institution. 112  In 2006, Oklahoma expanded this restriction to
forbid temporary and permanent residence of registered sex offenders within 2,000 feet
of playgrounds, parks, and licensed child care facilities, in addition to schools and
educational institutions.113 Problems with the new residency restrictions quickly became
apparent, and as sex offenders were unable to find residences that complied with the
restrictions, 114 they went underground and fell off the registry completely by not
registering their residences. 115 Law enforcement expressed concern that it was more
103. Stromberg, supra n. 93, at 23.
104. Id. at 23-24.
105. Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 16-17.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 725; Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 16.
108. See e.g. 720 111. Comp. Stat. 5/11-9.3(b-5) & 9.4(b-5) (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(B) (Supp. 2007).
109. Jill S. Levenson, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, 21 Crim. Just. Stud.
153, 154 (2008) (citations omitted).
110. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1034 (2005); Stromberg, supra
n. 93, at 25.
111. See e.g. Ala. Code § 15-20-26(h) (West 2005); Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(D); Tenn. Code Ann § 40-39-
21 1(f) (Lexis Supp. 2008).
112. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590 (Supp. 2003) (superseded Jul. 1,2006).
113. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590 (Supp. 2006) (superseded Nov. 1, 2007).
114. In the two largest cities in Oklahoma, Oklahoma City and Tulsa, residences that comply with the
restrictions are very difficult to find. Carrie Coppemoll, Bryan Dean & John David Sutter, Sex Offenders
Exiled, Oklahoman IA (Aug. 20, 2006) (in Oklahoma City, only 16 percent of addresses fall outside the
restricted area); Shannon Muchmore, Registration Law Backfire Forecast: Changes Likely to Persuade Sex
Offenders to Ignore It, Police Fear, Tulsa World A-I, A-l, A-6 (Jul. 7, 2006) (Approximately eight percent of
Tulsa complies with the residency restrictions. However, the area actually available for residency is probably
less because of industrial and high-rent areas.).
115. Nicole Marshall, Law Driving Sex Offenders Underground, Police Say, Tulsa World A-I, A-1 (May 14,
2007) (the number of registered sex offenders in Tulsa dropped from 540 to 372 in approximately two years).
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important to know where offenders actually reside than to restrict offenders from certain
areas because having fewer registered offenders makes it difficult to conduct a
meaningful search of the sex offender database.
116
Because of the state's experience with sex offenders dropping off the registry, the
author of the 2007 bill amending Oklahoma's Sex Offenders Registration Act,
Representative Gus Blackwell, sought to add language tying the tiered system to the
residency restrictions. 117 Despite the push from law enforcement,1 18 the bill, as enacted,
did not address this problem and the statutory residency restrictions still apply to all
registered sex offenders, regardless of the risk classification. 
119
II. CHALLENGES TO SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION STATUTES
Offenders have challenged sex offender registration, notification, and residency
restriction laws on multiple grounds, including double jeopardy, 120 equal protection, 12 1
invasion of privacy, 122 and cruel and unusual punishment. 123  But the primary
challenges allege violations of the Due Process Clause, 124 which guarantees the right to
life, liberty, and property, and violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 125 which prohibits
retroactive punishment. 126  The United States Supreme Court has addressed and
sustained challenges to states' registration and community notification laws on these
grounds, 127 but has not yet considered the constitutionality of residency restrictions,
having denied certiorari on the 2003 Eighth Circuit decision in Doe v. Miller.128 The
Supreme Court's decisions on sex offender registration and notification statutes provide
a practical framework that other courts have extended and used in deciding challenges to
residency restrictions.129
116. Id. atA-4.
117. Jennifer Mock & Bryan Dean, Tiered System Viewed for Sex Offender Law, Oklahoman 6A (Apr. 22,
2007); Jennifer Mock, State Seeking to Improve Offender Law, Oklahoman 4A (May 16, 2007).
118. Mock & Dean, supra n. 117, at 6A.
119. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(A) (unlawful for "any" registered sex offender to reside, temporarily or
permanently, within the 2,000 foot radius (emphasis added)).
120. E.g. Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000) (Public disclosure is civil in nature and
does not constitute punishment. Therefore, there is no double jeopardy violation.).
121. E.g. A.A. v. State, 895 A.2d 453, 463-64 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (The statute served a legitimate
state interest and did not irrationally target offenders. Therefore, the statute withstood equal protection
scrutiny).
122. E.g. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 (1998) (The
right to privacy only includes personal information and not the collection and dissemination of information
already available to the public.).
123. E.g. State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 676 (Kan. 1998) (Public access to information did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, particularly when public access is a consequence of offender's own criminal acts.).
124. U.S. Const. amend. V, XWV, § I.
125. Id. at art. 1, §§ 9, cl. 3, 10, cl. I.
126. The Supreme Court first identified laws that raise ex post facto concerns in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386,
390 (1798).
127. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. 1.
128. 405 F.3d 700.
129. See e.g. Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2128
(2007); Miller, 405 F.3d 700; Graham v. Henry, 2006 WL 2645130 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2006); State v.
Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (111. App. 2005).
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A. Procedural Due Process
In general, procedural due process refers to the process by which the government
deprives a person of a life, liberty, or property interest. 130 When facing a loss of one of
these protected interests, the minimum process due to an individual is notice of the action
against him or her and the opportunity to address the action. 13 1  In Connecticut
Department of Public Safety v. Doe,132 Doe, a sex-offender, filed a class-action federal
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983133 challenging Connecticut's sex offender registry
law, 134 but the Supreme Court found no procedural due process violation. 135  Doe
claimed that the State deprived him of his reputation, allegedly a liberty interest, without
notice or hearing, by making his status publicly available on the Internet, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 136  Connecticut's Megan's Law
required individuals convicted of certain offenses to register as a sex offender and
provided for community notification through a publicly accessible website, 137 without
regard to the offender's degree of current dangerousness. 138  The registration
requirement was based solely on the fact of a previous conviction of specified offenses
and not the risk of current dangerousness.1
39
Doe asserted that he was not a dangerous sexual offender and claimed the
registration and notification harmed his reputation, which is a protected liberty
interest. 140  The State argued that the government had not deprived him of a liberty
interest, relying on Paul v. Davis,14 1 where the Supreme Court held that mere injury to
reputation does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest, even when
defamatory. 14 2 Doe further asserted that the state's failure to provide him with a hearing
to determine whether he was dangerous violated his procedural due process rights.
143
Without deciding whether Doe was deprived of a liberty interest, the Supreme Court
130. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
131. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (citing Jt. Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
132. 538 U.S. ].
133. Section 1983 allows individuals to sue, in federal court, for a state's violation of his or her protected
civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
134. Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 6.
135. Id. at4.
136. Id. at 6 (quoting Doe v. Dept. Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2001)).
137. The website included a disclaimer to the public stating the main purpose of the website was to make
information available and that there had been no determination of dangerousness of any individual listed, but
individuals were included "solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law." Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety,
538 U.S. at 5 (quoting Dept. Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d at 44).
138. Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4-5, 7 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251, 54-252, 54-254, 54-257,
54-258 (2001)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 6.
141. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) ("The words 'liberty' and 'property'... do not in terms single out reputation
as a candidate for special protection over and above other interests that may be protected by state law. While
[the Court has] ... pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the 'stigma' which may result from defamation
by the government in a variety of contexts, this ... does not establish the proposition that reputation alone,
apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either 'liberty' or 'property' by itself sufficient
to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.").
142. Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. 693).
143. Id. at 6.
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found no violation because even if Doe was deprived of a liberty interest, procedural due
process does not entitle an individual to a hearing to establish an immaterial fact under
state law.144 Whether or not Doe was currently dangerous was irrelevant to the statute,
and therefore, he was not entitled to a hearing to determine that fact.
14 5
B. Substantive Due Process
The substantive due process component of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
"protects fundamental rights that are so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."' 146 Unless "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling . . . interest," the government cannot infringe upon
individuals' liberty interests, regardless of the process provided. 14 7 The first step in a
substantive due process inquiry is to determine the nature of the individual right
asserted. 148 If a fundamental right is not involved, a statute need only survive a "rational
basis" analysis, which requires only a reasonable fit between the government's purpose
and the chosen means. 149 Alternatively, if a fundamental right is implicated, the court
must apply a "strict scrutiny" analysis and determine if the government action is
narrowly tailored.
150
Doe failed to raise a challenge on substantive due process grounds and sought
relief solely on the alleged procedural component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
151
Because the question was not properly before the Supreme Court, it did not decide
whether the statute violated substantive due process principles. 152 However, in dicta, the
Court indicated a challenge could be successful by proving that the substantive rule of
law conflicts with a provision of the Federal Constitution.153 Although the Supreme
Court did not have to decide whether the sex offender registry statute violated any
substantive due process rights, 154 other courts have had to address this issue. 155 These
courts have consistently held that the statutes do not infringe upon any fundamental
rights, 156 including the rights to privacy, 157 housing, 158 employment, 159 and family
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id.
146. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (i1 th Cir. 1994)).
147. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
149. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997); U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994); Reno, 507
U.S. at 305.
150. E.g. Reno, 507 U.S. at 302; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,
503-04 (1965) (quoting Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
151. Conn. Dept. Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 7.
154. Id. at8.
155. See e.g. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1339; Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404-05 (3d Cir. 1999); Cutshall v.
Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 2004); Russell, 124
F.3d at 1094.
156. E.g. Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597 ("persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have
a fundamental right to be free from the registration and notification requirements").
157. E.g. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1094 (finding no violation of the right to privacy because the information that
was collected and disseminated was already available to the public).
158. See e.g. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1343, 1345 (offenders' assertion that the statute interfered with the ability
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relationships.
160
C. Ex Post Facto Application of Law
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the government from both retroactively
imposing punishment for an act that was not a crime when it was committed and from
imposing more punishment for a crime than was allowed by law at the time it was
committed. 161 The Ex Post Facto Clause applies exclusively to statutes that are penal in
nature. 162 To determine if a statute is penal or civil in nature, the courts look first at the
language of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended the statute to be
civil or criminal. 163 Courts will ordinarily defer to the legislature's express intent to
create a civil statute unless there is the "clearest proof' that the statute is punitive in
purpose or effect.
164
The Supreme Court upheld a challenge to Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act
on ex post facto grounds.165 The Act provided for retroactive application of registration
and community notification for certain offenders physically in the state. 16 6 The Supreme
Court held that the retroactive application of the Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the law was non-punitive. 167 In reaching this decision, the Court first
applied statutory construction to ascertain whether the state legislature intended to
establish civil or criminal proceedings 168 and found that the legislature's intent was to
create civil and non-punitive proceedings. 169 The Court reached this decision by placing
emphasis on the Act's purpose to protect the public from sex offenders; placement of the
Act in the state's Health, Safety, and Housing Code and not within the criminal code;
and lack of safeguards associated with criminal procedures.
170
Having determined the legislature's intent was to create a civil regime, the Court
still had to analyze whether the scheme was "so punitive in either purpose or effect as to
negate [the legislature's] intention."'171 The Court examined the regulation using five of
the seven factors 172 previously established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,173 which,
while not exhaustive or dispositive, are "useful guideposts" for determining if a civil law
to find and/or keep housing).
159. E.g. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 479-80 (rejecting plaintiffs assertion that the statute deprives him of a right
to employment because the statute did not interfere with registrants' ability to seek and obtain employment).
160. E.g. Paul P., 170 F.3d at 405 (any indirect effect on registrants' family relationships did not "restrict...
freedom of action with respect to [registrants'] families").
161. Dobbert v. Fla., 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)).
162. Kan. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997) (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 361.
164. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,249 (1980)).
165. Smith, 538 U.S. at 106.
166. Id. at 90 (citing 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41 § 12(a); Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(a)-(b) (Lexis 2000)).
167. Id. at 105-06.
168. Id. at 92.
169. Id. at 96.
170. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93-96.
171. Id. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361).
172. The remaining two factors, "whether the [sanction] comes into play ... on a finding of scienter and
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime," were not relevant to the facts of the case. Id. at
105.
173. 372 U.S. 144(1963).
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is punitive in purpose or effect. 174 Those factors look at whether the regulation: (1) has
traditionally or historically been regarded as punishment; (2) promotes the traditional
aims of punishment; (3) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (4) has a rational
connection to a non-punitive purpose; or (5) is excessive with respect to the non-punitive
purpose. 1
7 5
In regards to the first factor, the Court rejected the argument that registration and
notification statutes resemble shaming punishments used during the colonial period.
17 6
The Court distinguished these statutes, as colonial shaming often included a corporal
component, or at a minimum, "involved more than the dissemination of information.
' 177
The Court emphasized the criminal justice system's tradition of open and public
indictments, trials, and sentencing as essential to maintaining public respect, protecting
the rights of the accused, and ensuring respect for the system. 178 The Court pointed out
that any negative stigma associated with registration and notification under Megan's Law
"results not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of
accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is already public."' 179 The
statute's purpose was not to cause humiliation but to inform the public for its own
safety. 180 Second, although Megan's Law may deter future crimes, and deterrence is one
of the traditional aims of punishment, the mere presence of a deterrent effect does not
render the law as criminal in nature. 
1 8 1
Third, the Court found that the law did not impose an affirmative disability or
restraint. 182 There was no physical restraint, and the offenders were not restrained from
pursuing activities, jobs, or residences. 183  In contrast to probation and supervised
release, the offenders were not under supervision and were free to move and live and
work anywhere they wished; their only obligation was to comply with the reporting
requirement. 184
Fourth, Alaska's Megan's Law was determined to have a legitimate and non-
punitive purpose, and alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in the community
was rationally related to its purpose of promoting and ensuring public safety. 185 And
fifth, finding that the appropriate question to ask in inquiring whether the regulation is
excessive is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable and not whether the
legislature made the best choice, the Court found that the law was reasonable and not
excessive in regards to its purpose. 186 The Court determined that the legislative intent
174. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at97-98.
177. Id. at 98.
178. Id. at 99.
179. Smith, 538 U.S at 98.
180. Id. at 99.
181. Id. at 102 (many laws may "deter crime without imposing punishment," and "'[t]o hold that the mere
presence of a deterrent purpose renders [the law] "criminal" ... would severely undermine the Government's
ability to [regulate]' (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105)).
182. Id. at 100.
183. Id.
184. Smith, 538 U.S at 101.
185. Id. at 102-03.
186. Id. at 105.
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was to establish a civil regulatory scheme, and because it was not shown by the clearest
proof that the effects of the law negate that intent, the Court found the retroactive
application of Alaska's Megan's Law was non-punitive and, therefore, did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. 
187
III. CHALLENGES TO RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
By applying the same framework the Supreme Court used in analyzing sex
offender registration and notification statutes, other courts have upheld the
constitutionality of sex offender residency restrictions. 188 For example, the States'
residency restrictions in both Iowa and Arkansas were challenged and upheld on appeal
to the respective States' Supreme Courts and, on appeal, to the Eight Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 89 An Oklahoma court also used this analysis in denying a temporary
injunction motion to prevent the application of the residency restriction. 19° This section
will examine how the Eighth Circuit, the highest federal court to address challenges to
sex offender residency restrictions, 19 1 as well as how state supreme
192 and appellate 19 3
courts, have applied the Supreme Court's analysis to residency restrictions.
A. Due Process
Despite differences in the States' statutes, the Eight Circuit found no procedural
due process violation in both Miller1 94 and Weems v. Little Rock Police Department.
19 5
Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v.
Doe,19 6 the court held that due process did not entitle the offenders to a hearing in Iowa
because the State's statute applied the residency restrictions to all sex offenders,
regardless of estimates of future dangerousness. 197 The Arkansas statute, however, did
couple sex offenders' risk assessments to the residency restrictions, 198 entitling the
offenders to procedural protections. 199  But without deciding whether the risk
assessment and resulting residency restriction deprive sex offenders of a protected liberty
interest, the court concluded that the procedures used by Arkansas provided adequate due
process. 200 The court reached this conclusion by weighing three factors: first, "the
private interest affected by the [government's] actions"; second, the risk of erroneous
187. Id. at 105-06.
188. E.g. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769.
189. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1019-20; Miller, 405 F.3d 700; Ark. Dept. Corrects. v. Bailey, 247 S.W.3d 851,
862 (Ark. 2007); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 670.
190. Graham, 2006 WL 2645130 at **6-7 (motion sustained because offender failed to show a likelihood of
success on the merits of the constitutional challenge).
191. E.g. Weems, 453 F.3d 1010; Miller, 405 F.3d 700.
192. E.g. Bailey, 247 S.W.3d 851; Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655.
193. E.g. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769.
194. 405 F.3d at 709.
195. 453 F.3dat 1019-20.
196. 538 U.S. 1.
197. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
198. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1013 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-128(a) (Lexis 2003)) (residency restrictions
applied only to "Level 3 'high risk offenders' and Level 4 'sexually violent predators').
199. Id. at 1019.
200. Id. at 1017-1018.
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determinations through the procedure used and the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards; and third, the government's interest, including "fiscal and
administrative burdens" that additional procedures would entail.
20 1
In Arkansas, a Sex Offender Assessment Committee oversees an examination team
that assigns risk levels to the sex offenders. 20 2 This team determines risk by reviewing
records and historical data, engaging in psychological testing and evaluation, engaging in
actuarial analysis based on objective criteria, and interviewing the individual offender.
20 3
The team usually follows the actuarial prediction model but does have some flexibility to
increase or decrease the risk level based on special circumstances not accounted for in
the model. 204 If an adjustment is warranted, it is "fully documented and ... is subject to
review by the . . . Committee. ' 2° 5  During this process, the sex offender has an
opportunity to be heard during the interview and has access to most of the records
maintained by the team.20 6 Although the offender is not entitled to judicial review until
after the notification and residency restrictions are in effect, the court found that the
combination of procedures provided prior to the risk assignment and procedures
available after the assignment provided sufficient due process protection. 20 7  The
offenders' interest in avoiding an erroneous risk assessment was adequately protected by
providing reasonable procedures and was adequately balanced against the government's
interest in protecting children from sex offenders.
20 8
Sex offenders have also lost challenges to residency restrictions on substantive due
process grounds.20 9 The offenders alleged the residency restrictions infringed upon their
fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and choice in family matters, the right
to interstate and intrastate travel, and the right to live where they want.2 10 Regarding the
right to choice in family matters, courts have found that the residency restrictions do not
implicate a fundamental right because they do "not 'operate directly on the family
relationship."' 211 Although the statutes restrict offenders from living in specific areas,
the statutes do not restrict with whom the offenders may live. 2 12 Because a fundamental
right was not implicated, the statutes were reviewed using a rational basis standard and
not a heightened strict scrutiny standard.2 13 By applying this standard, the courts have
found that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from sex
201. Id. at 1018 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
202. Id.




207. Id. at 1019.
208. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1019.
209. E.g. id. at 1015; Miller, 405 F.3d at 710-16; Bailey, 247 S.W.3d 852; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665;
Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 777.
210. E.g. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1014; Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
211. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Miller, 405 F.3d at 710); accord e.g. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 664;
Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776-77.
212. E.g. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1015; Miller, 405 F.3d at 710; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 664-65; Leroy, 828
N.E.2d at 776.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss3/7
2009] SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT "OK" 633
offenders, and the statutes are rationally related to pursuing that purpose.
214
The Eighth Circuit also used the rational basis standard in sustaining challenges to
the residency restrictions based on the right to interstate and intrastate travel.2 15 The sex
offenders argued that the right to interstate travel was implicated by deterring out-of-
state convicted sex offenders from migrating into another state.2 16 The court did not find
merit in this argument because the statute did not erect an actual barrier to interstate
travel and continued to allow "free ingress and egress to and from" the state.2 17 Nor did
the statute discriminate by treating residents differently from nonresidents. 218 Although
some sex offenders may be deterred from traveling into the state, the court found that
this was insufficient to implicate the fundamental right to interstate travel.2 19 Without
deciding whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, the court held that the
right, even if recognized, was not implicated for the same reasons that the right to
interstate travel was not implicated.
220
The Supreme Court has not recognized a fundamental right to live where you want
and has cautioned against extending protection to an unenumerated asserted right or
liberty interest. 221 Therefore, the offenders' challenge to residency restrictions on this
ground does not require strict scrutiny but involves the rational basis standard. 222 Using
this standard, the courts find that the government's interest in protecting children is
rationally promoted by the residency restrictions.
223
B. Ex Post Facto
By using the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe,224 courts
have sustained ex post facto challenges to the constitutionality of sex offender residency
restrictions; 22 5 dissents, however, commonly disagree and find that the statutes are
violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 226 The courts must first determine whether the
legislature intended to create civil or punitive proceedings. 227 If the legislative intent
was to establish criminal punishment, then the statute is an ex post facto law. 228 But if
the legislative intent was to create civil and non-punitive proceedings, the courts must
then determine whether the statute is nonetheless "so punitive either in purpose or effect
214. E.g. Weems, 453 F.3dat 1015.
215. Id. at 1016-17; Miller, 405 F.3d at 712-13.
216. Miller, 405 F.3d at 711.
217. Id. at 712 (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 713; Weems, 453 F.3d at 1014-15.
221. E.g. Miller, 405 F.3d at 713-14 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720).
222. Id. at 724; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665.
223. Miller, 405 F.3d at 716; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665.
224. 538 U.S. 84.
225. E.g. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1017; Miller, 405 F.3d at 722-23; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 669; Leroy, 828
N.E.2d at 782.
226. E.g. Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Seering, 701 N.W.2d
at 671 (Wiggins, J., & Lavorato, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 785
(Kuehn, J., dissenting).
227. E.g. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361).
228. Id.
17
Thoreson: Sex Offender Residency Restrictions Are Not OK: Why Oklahoma Need
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008
TULSA LA W REVIEW
as to negate [the stated] intention." 2 29  When examining sex offender residency
restrictions, courts have consistently found that the legislative intent is clearly to create a
civil regulatory measure. 230 The legislative intent of these statutes is to protect the
public from sex offenders, and the residency restrictions are incidental to the
government's authority to protect public health and safety.23 1 To determine whether the
statute is nonetheless punitive in purpose or effect, courts apply the same factors the
Supreme Court applied in examining sex offender registration and notification statutes in
Smith:232 whether the statute has traditionally or historically been regarded as
punishment; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; imposes an affirmative
disability or restraint; has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose; or is excessive
with respect to the non-punitive purpose. 233 Furthermore, "only the clearest proof' can
overcome the legislative intent and change an intended civil scheme into a criminal
penalty.
234
Regarding the first factor, offenders have argued that the residency restrictions
resemble banishment, which has historically been regarded as punishment.
235
Traditional banishment required offenders to leave their original community and because
of their tarnished reputation, they were not easily admitted into a new one. 236  The
banishment could last either for life or for a specified period of time.
237 In Miller,238
while acknowledging that banishment entails an extreme form of residency restriction,
the Eighth Circuit distinguished traditional banishment from the sex offender residency
restrictions. 239 The court reasoned that unlike traditional banishment, the offenders are
not completely expelled from the community; they are only restricted in where they may
reside.2 40  The court also pointed out that many offenders would not be required to
change residences because the state statute grandfathered in offenders with residences
established prior to the effective date.24 1  Also relevant to the court, sex offender
residency restrictions are a relatively new and unique trend, which suggests the statute
does not involve traditional punishment.
242
The dissent in Miller agreed the residency restrictions were not the same as
traditional banishment but believed this factor weighed towards finding the law punitive
because it sufficiently resembled banishment. 243  The dissent relied on the district
229. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49)).
230. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1017; Miller, 405 F.3d at 719; Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 779.
231. E.g. Miller, 405 F.3d at 718 (citation omitted).
232. 538 U.S. at 97.
233. E.g. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 667; Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 780.
234. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (citations omitted)).
235. E.g. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 667.
236. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98 (citing Thomas Blomberg & Karol Lucken, American Penology: A History of
Control 30-31 (Aldine de Gruyter 2000)).
237. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719 (quoting U.S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269-70 (1905) (Brewer & Peckham, JJ.,
dissenting)).
238. 405 F.3d 700.
239. Id. at 719.
240. Id.; accord Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 667 (determining that the statute is not banishment because the
restrictions only apply to residency, and "offenders.. . are free to engage in most community activities").
241. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719.
242. Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 724-25 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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court's factual findings and pointed out that the restrictions effectively banned sex
offenders from living in many communities.244 In large communities, the only areas
available to offenders were industrial, expensive developments, or on the outskirts of
town with limited housing options. 245 In smaller communities, the entire town could be
in the restricted area.246 Therefore, the dissent found the problems in finding housing
effectively resulted in banishment from most of the state's cities and larger towns.
247
Two dissenting justices on the Iowa Supreme Court also found the residency
restrictions were tantamount to banishment in State v. Seering.248  The dissent
distinguished the Supreme Court's finding that registration and notification are not
equivalent to banishment or shaming249 because the residency restrictions place
additional and onerous obligations on sex offenders.2 50 The dissenting justices thought
the restrictions were equivalent to banishment by marking the offenders as people to be
shunned and resulting in community ostracism.
2 51
Second, courts examine whether the law promotes the traditional aims of
punishment, typically deterrence and retribution.252 Although the residency restrictions
may have a deterrent and retributive effect, the Eighth Circuit found that this was
insufficient to render the statute as punishment.2 53  Relying on the Supreme Court's
finding that many laws may have a deterrent effect without imposing punishment,2 54 the
court emphasized the purpose of the restriction was not to deter offenders from
committing sex crimes, but to "reduce the likelihood of reoffense by limiting [potential]
temptation" and opportunity.2 55 Likewise, any potential retributive effect is reasonably
related to the risk of recidivism and the legislative purpose of protecting public safety.
2 56
The third factor to "consider is whether the law 'imposes an affirmative disability
or restraint.' 2 57  The Eighth Circuit found that the residency restrictions are more
disabling than the sex offender registration and notification laws that withstood the
Supreme Court's analysis. 258  However, they are less disabling than the civil
commitment of certain sex offenders,259 which has been upheld by the Supreme
Court.260 The court found that the degree of restraint utilized must be weighed against
244. Id. at 724.
245. Id.
246. Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Id.
248. 701 N.W.2d at 671-72 (Wiggins, J., & Lavorato, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Id. at 671 (distinguishing Smith, 538 U.S. 84).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 672.
252. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).
253. Id.
254. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
255. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720; accord Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781 (citing Dept. Revenue Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767, 780 (1994)) ("even an obvious deterrent purpose does not necessarily make a law punitive").
256. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720; accord Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781 (no evidence the restriction was designed as a
form of retribution, and it has a reasonable relationship to the goal of protecting children from offenders).
257. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 100).
258. Id. at 721 (citation omitted).
259. Id.
260. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (citing U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (Although the civil
commitment of offenders does involve an affirmative restraint, the mere fact of detention does not necessarily
19
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the other relevant factors, including whether the law is rationally related to the legislative
purpose and whether the law is excessive in respect to that purpose.
26 1
The dissent disagreed and distinguished the residency restrictions from the sex
offender registration and notification laws by pointing out the Supreme Court found it
significant in its analysis that the sex offenders could freely change residences. 262 In
distinguishing probation or supervised release from the sex offender registration, the
Supreme Court did emphasize that sex offenders could move, live, and work where they
want without supervision.263 The residency restrictions could be upheld using this same
analysis, however. Offenders subjected to the residency restrictions are still free to move
and work as other citizens and do not have to seek permission to do so; they are only
restricted from residing within certain areas. 264  Also similar to registration
requirements, failure to comply with the statutory residency restriction may result in
criminal prosecution, but that prosecution is a separate proceeding from the original
offense. 265
The most significant factor in determining whether a law's effects are punitive is
whether the law has a rational connection to the non-punitive purpose.26 6 A law is "not
deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the non-punitive aims
it seeks to advance. ' 267  Using this undemanding standard, the Eighth Circuit easily
reached the conclusion that the legislative objective of protecting children from the risk
posed by repeat offenders was rationally related to the residency restrictions.
268
The final factor in this ex post facto analysis is whether the law is excessive in
relation to the non-punitive purpose. 269 Even when the residency restrictions apply to all
statutory sex offenders without any individualized assessment of risk, courts have
consistently held that the restrictions are not excessive. 270  Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, the Eighth Circuit held that the government is not obligated to provide for
individualized determinations and can make reasonable categorical judgments that
convicted offenders may be subject to certain regulatory consequences. 271 The Supreme
Court has held that even without individualized determinations, convicted felons can be
subjected to non-punitive regulations, including being prohibited from practicing
medicine, serving as officers or agents of a union, and registering as a sex offender.
272
mean the government imposed punishment.). The government has a legitimate non-punitive objective in
restraining mentally ill individuals who pose a danger to the public. Id. (citation omitted).
261. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 725 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 100).
263. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.
264. See id. (Although offenders must inform authorities of a change, they do not have to seek permission to
do so.). See also e.g. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 584(D) (offenders must provide notification at least three business
days prior to changing addresses (emphasis added)).
265. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 101-02. See also e.g. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(D) (willful violation of residency
restriction is a felony).
266. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).
267. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.
268. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721; see also Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 777 (reasonable to conclude children would be
protected by restricting offenders from residing in close proximity).
269. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
270. Miller, 405 F.3d at 722; Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668; Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 782.
271. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 103).
272. Id. at 721-22 (citing Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160
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The risk of sex offenders re-offending is higher than average, 273 and it is difficult to
predict which measures are most likely to prevent recidivism. 274 Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit found the residency restrictions were not excessive in relation to their purpose of
protecting children.275 And when the residency restrictions are based on individualized
risk assessments, the statute is on even stronger constitutional grounds, and it decreases
the likelihood of the court finding the residency restrictions excessive.
276
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
There are over 660,000 registered sex offenders in the United States 277 and at least
100,000 of these offenders are noncompliant. 278 "When an offender is off the radar,
then the existing compliance, treatment, and monitoring options will have no effect,"
279
and the public will be endangered. Knowing where the convicted sex offenders live,
even if it is in close proximity to a school or daycare, is better than not knowing where to
find them.
2 80
Preventing children from being kidnapped and assaulted and reducing sex
offenders' access to children are the most popular rationales put forth in support of
residency restrictions.2 8 1  National publicity of horrendous crimes prompted swift
legislation named after victims of child abductions. 282 However, strangers to the victim
do not commit the majority of sexual offenses, particularly when the victim is a child.283
Family members or acquaintances attack the vast majority of victims, 284 not strangers
sitting across the street from schools and playgrounds. 285  As a result, the residency
restrictions will have little, if any, impact on most of these victims.286 The restrictions
(1960); Smith, 538 U.S. at 106).
273. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (citing McKune, 536 U.S. at 33-34 (citation omitted)); Miller, 405 F.3d at 722.
274. Miller, 405 F.3d at 722. Expert testimony indicated that reducing the frequency of contact between
offenders and children could reduce temptation and opportunity to re-offend. Id.
275. Id. at 722-23; see also Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668 (risk that offenders might re-offend is balanced
against the imprecise nature of protecting children).
276. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1017.
277. Ntl. Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Registered Sex Offenders in the U.S.,
http://www.missingkids.com/en-US/documents/sex-offender-map.pdf (map showing number of registered
offenders in each state) (Dec. 15, 2008).
278. Ntl. Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, First U.S. Marshals Begin Specialized Training in Hunt for
100,000 Missing Sex Offenders, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?
LanguageCountry=enUS&Pageld=3106 (Mar. 20, 2007).
279. Corey Raybum Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85
Wash. U. L. Rev. 101, 144 (2007).
280. See id.; Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 24.
281. Singleton, supra n. 15, at 610.
282. As discussed supra pt. I(A), the Jacob Wetterling Act, Megan's Law, Jessica's Law, and Adam Walsh
Act. See also 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006) (recognizing 17 named victims).
283. Greenfeld, supra n. 1, at 4 (approximately 75 percent of rapes and sexual assaults involve offenders
known to the victim); Snyder, supra n. 1, at 10 tbl. 6 (only seven percent of child victims were assaulted by a
stranger, and only 27.3 percent of adult victims were assaulted by a stranger); Howard N. Snyder & Melissa
Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report 33 (U.S. Dept. Justice, Off. Just. Programs,
Off. Juv. Just. & Delinquency Prevention 2006) (only five percent of sexual assaults are committed by a
stranger).
284. Snyder, supra n. 1, at 10.
285. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 725 (in most sexual assault cases, schools, parks, and playgrounds are not a
factor).
286. Minn. Dept. Corrects., Residential Proximity & Sex Offense Recidivism in Minnesota 25 (2007)
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reflect a false assumption that residential proximity to children increases the risk of
recidivism.28 7  Residency restrictions will prevent very few offenders from re-
offending.288 Research suggests that in most cases, an offender's ability to establish a
relationship with a child is more important than where the offender lives, and the
restrictions do nothing to prevent family members and acquaintances from building and
exploiting a child's trust.289  The restrictions do not prevent offenders from driving
across town, 29 and if an offender is determined to re-offend, the restrictions will have
no effect.
291
Not only may the residence restrictions be ineffective, but they may be
counterproductive and increase recidivism.292 Shortages of housing options that comply
with the residence restrictions effectively push the offenders either into "sex offender
ghettos ' 293 or into isolated rural areas and away from larger communities with
supportive and necessary resources, including employment options and mental health
treatment.294  Taking away housing, employment, and treatment options can create
financial and emotional stress and lead to increased instability. 295  These additional
stressors are dynamic risk factors frequently associated with sex offender recidivism.
296
In addition to limited access to resources, the restrictions prohibit offenders from
returning to their homes and living with supportive family members. 297  Feeling
desperate and deprived can "make the offender feel hopeless and useless and therefore[,]
bring[] him closer to the feelings that caused him to be an offender in the first place."
298
Rehabilitation is "more successful when offenders are employed, have family and
community connections, and have a stable residence. ' 299  By implementing the
residency restrictions, legislatures intended to decrease the rate of recidivism, but in
reality, the restrictions can remove offenders from positive support networks, 300 creating
a "recipe for recidivism."
30 1
(available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/documents/04-O7SexOffenderReport-Proximity.pdf).
287. No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the U.S., 19 Hum. Rights Watch 115 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter
No Easy Answers]. But see Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence
Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd? 49 Intl. J. Offender Therapy & Comp.
Criminology 168, 175 (2005) (access to victims and sexual interest in children is associated with recidivism,
but blanket restrictions may fail to consider individualized risk factors).
288. Minn. Dept. Corrects., supra n. 286, at 25. See also Levenson & Cotter, supra n. 287, at 175.
289. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 725. One study suggested that most recidivists come into contact with their
victims through "social or relationship proximity," and the most common contact was from dating the child's
mother. No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 116 (footnote omitted).
290. Levenson & Cotter, supra n. 287, at 169 (sex offenders more likely to travel to another neighborhood
where they would not be recognized than seek victims in close residential proximity).
291. Id. at 176.
292. Id. at 169; see also Levenson & D'Amora, supra n. 98, at 183.
293. Yung, supra n. 279, at 142, 157.
294. Levenson & D'Amora supra n. 98, at 183; Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 18.
295. Levenson & Cotter, supra n. 287, at 175; No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 116.
296. Levenson & Cotter, supra n. 287, at 175; Levenson & Hem, supra n. 99, at 63 (citation omitted).
297. Levenson & Cotter, supra n. 287, at 172; see also No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 117.
298. Levenson, supra n. 109, at 158.
299. Iowa Co. Attys. Assoc., Statement on Sex Offender Residency Restrictions in Iowa 4 (Feb. 14, 2006)
(available at http://www.iowa-icaa.comICAA%20STATEMENTS/Sex%200ffender/20Residency/
20Statement%2ODec%2011%2006.pdf).
300. No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 116-17.
301. Yung, supra n. 279, at 144; see also Levenson, supra n. 109, at 163.
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Further, residency restrictions that disperse sex offenders from larger communities
may increase the risk of child sexual abuse in rural communities. 30 2  Geographic
isolation in rural areas provides more isolated locations for potential assaults to occur.
30 3
Social norms of keeping things private in rural areas may also prevent detection by law
enforcement. 304  In smaller communities, there is typically more social interaction
among acquaintances, and most children are abused by someone they know.30 5 These
factors, in addition to removing offenders from support networks, may contribute to
higher rates of child sexual abuse in rural areas.
30 6
In urban areas, continued difficulty in finding housing that complies with the
residency restrictions may result in sex offenders forming their own communities, most
typically located in apartment complexes or motels. 307 There is already evidence of this
problem in Oklahoma, 308 and it may continue to increase. At first glance, this may seem
like a positive outcome by isolating offenders from potential victims, but, in reality, it
creates a dangerous networking opportunity for sex offenders.30 9  As one scholar
observed,
Creating a community with a lot of persons prone to repeat past sex crimes will facilitate
an environment in which sexual violence is more acceptable. There are fewer normalizing,
socializing, and other pressures against sexual violence in a community in which virtually
everyone is there precisely because they have committed some form of sexual violence in
their life. . . . [L]awmakers are risking the creation of environments in which sexual
violence is the norm, not the exception.
Uniting sex offenders and providing them an opportunity to socialize and learn from
each other only hinders public safety.
3 11
Law enforcement's monitoring of sex offenders has become more difficult due to
the residency restrictions. 312 Due to the inability to comply with the restrictions, sex
offenders provide false addresses, change residences without notifying law enforcement,
and may disappear completely.3 13 For example, Iowa saw the number of unaccounted-
for sex offenders double only one year after the enactment of residency restrictions.
3 14
Oklahoma has also seen an increase in the number of unaccounted-for sex offenders.
3 15
302. Levenson & D'Amora, supra n. 98, at 184.
303. Kim S. Menard & R. Barry Ruback, Prevalence and Processing of Child Sexual Abuse: A Multi-Data-
Set Analysis of Urban and Rural Counties, 27 L. & Hum. Behav. 385, 399 (2003).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Levenson & D'Amora, supra n. 98, at 184.
307. Yung, supra n. 279, at 140.
308. David Schulte, Sex Offenders to Get Boot: New Park to Make Town West-Area Motels off Limits, Tulsa
World A-18 (Sept. 18, 2007) (approximately 60 registered offenders living in four hotels along an interstate
outside of Tulsa).
309. Yung, supra n. 279, at 141.
310. Id. at 142.
311. Seeid. at 141-42.
312. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 726; No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 116.
313. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 726.
314. Id. See also Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 24 (prior to residency restriction, county sheriff knew where
almost all offenders lived; after restriction took effect, sheriff knows where only 50-55 percent of offenders
live) (citation omitted).
315. Marshall, supran. ll5, atA-1.
23
Thoreson: Sex Offender Residency Restrictions Are Not OK: Why Oklahoma Need
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008
TULSA LA W REVIEW
After enactment of the residency restrictions, sex offenders quickly discovered that they
could avoid the restrictions by falsely registering as homeless.3 16 In effect, residency
restrictions actually undercut sex offender registration laws 3 17 because homeless and lost
offenders are more difficult, if not impossible, to track and supervise.
3 18
Another unintended consequence of the residency restrictions is a decrease in the
number of sex offense convictions. 3 19 After the enactment of residency restrictions in
Iowa, prosecutors reported a decrease in the number of confessions as well as a decrease
in defendants' willingness to enter into plea agreements. 320 As a result, many offenders
will not be successfully prosecuted or held fully accountable and will not be required to
complete treatment or rehabilitation. 32 1 Public safety is compromised by a decrease in
accurate charges and convictions.
322
V. RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS IN OKLAHOMA
When everything is classified, then nothin§ is classified and the system becomes one to be
disregarded by the cynical or the careless.
32 3
The Oklahoma Legislature's concern for protecting children and others from
predatory sex offenders resulted in the original enactment of Oklahoma's Sex Offenders
Registration Act. 324  By adding residency restrictions to this Act, 32 5 the legislature
intended to keep registered sex offenders away from potential child victims 326 by
preventing offenders from living close to schools, day care facilities, parks, and
playgrounds. 327  The residency restrictions, however, apply to all registered sex
offenders, regardless of whether the triggering offense involved a child.32 8 The statute
treats rapists, child molesters, and one-time flashers the same, and all offenders are
subject to the residency restriction while registered; 329 the only difference is the length
of registration.
330
316. Nicole Marshall, Homeless Claims May Be False, Police Say, Tulsa World A-1 (Jan. 22, 2008).
317. Greenblatt, supra n. 5, at 724.
318. Nieto & Jung, supra n. 8, at 24; No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 116.
319. Iowa Co. Attys. Assoc., supra n. 299, at 3.
320. Id. at 3.
321. Id.
322. See id.
323. Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration & Community Notification: Past, Present, & Future, 34
New Eng. J. Crim. & Civ. Confinement 3, 14 (2008) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (The exact language of the case is "For when everything is classified, then nothing is
classified and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless.").
324. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 581(B)(Supp. 2007).
325. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590.
326. 35 Okla. Op. Atty. Gen. 51, 52 (2005); Coppemoll, Dean & Sutter, supra n. 114.
327. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(A).
328. Id.
329. See id.; Coppernoll, Dean & Sutter, supra n. 114, at IA.
330. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 583(C).
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In order to continue receiving federal funding, the legislature patterned
Oklahoma's risk levels after the tiers used in the Adam Walsh Act.3 3 1 Implementing
risk levels and acknowledging that sex offenders are not all the same is a small step in
the right direction towards improving the registration system.332 However, instead of
following other states' approaches of using individualized risk assessments,3 33 the risk
assessment review committee decided to follow the federal approach and classify
offenders based solely on the severity and recurrence of convictions 334 without
considering other relevant factors.335 This appears to be in contradiction to the plain
language of the statute. 336 The statute explicitly states the screening tool "must use an
objective point system under which a person is assigned a designated number of points
for each of the various factors. The offense for which the person is convicted shall serve
as the basis for the minimum numeric risk level assigned to the person."337 The statute
also states a "range of points on the sex offender screening tool" 338 should determine
each of the three different levels. However, the screening tool selected by the committee
does not look at "various factors"; 339 it looks at only one factor, the convicted
offense. 340  In addition, a "range" 34 1 of points does not determine each of the three
levels; one point equals level one, two points equal level two, and three points equal
level three.342  The risk level is based on a perceived and general risk according to
offense and is not based on the individual sex offender's threat to the community or
likelihood to re-offend.343  As implemented in Oklahoma, a sex offender's statutorily
assigned risk level may or may not be an accurate representation of that individual's
actual threat to the public.
344
Inexplicably, Oklahoma's Department of Corrections already uses individualized
risk assessments for probation and parole of sex offenders, 345 but these same risk
assessments are not used in assigning the statutory risk level of the applicable residency
restrictions.346 Within 45 days of probation or parole, all sex offenders must complete a
Sex Offender Need Assessment Rating ("SONAR") or Stable and Acute Assessment.
347
331. Josh Rabe, Capitol: A Look at the Progress of Two Oklahoma Laws That Went into Effect One Year
Ago-After the Ink Dried-Sex-Offender Rules Need Work, Agencies Say, Oklahoman II A (Nov. 1, 2007).
332. Id. See also Okla. Star. tit. 57, § 582.5(C).
333. See supra pt. l(B) (discussing different types of assessments).
334. Okla. Dept. Corrects., supra n. 83; E-mail from Jim Rabon, Administr., Sentence Admin. & Offender
Recs. Unit, Okla. Dept. Corrects., to Rhiannon Thoreson, Sex Offender Assessments (Nov. 13, 2007, 4:30 p.m.
CST) (copy on file with author).
335. Supra pt. (B) (discussing static and dynamic factors).
336. See Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C).
337. Id. (emphasis added).
338. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(l)-(3).
339. Id.
340. Okla. Dept. of Corrects., supra n. 83.
341. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(1)-(3).
342. Okla. Dept. of Corrects., supra n. 83.
343. See Rabe, supra n. 331 (levels are based on perceived risk and do not consider individual context).
344. See id.
345. Justin Jones & Okla. Dept. Corrects., Operations Memo. No. OP-160601: Supervision of Sex Offenders
3-4 (Jun. 6, 2007) (available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/opl6060l.pdf).
346. Rabon, supra n. 334.
347. Jones & Okla. Dept. Corrects., supra n. 345, at 3.
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Both of these tools examine stable and acute dynamic risk factors associated with
recidivism.348  While on probation or parole, this assessment is reviewed every six
months. 349 In addition, all male sex offenders must complete a Static-99 assessment,
designed to predict sexual and violent recidivism. 35  The SONAR and the Static-99 are
both commonly used actuarial assessments.35 1 The Static-99, used alone, can identify
offenders whose risk for sexual recidivism is greater than 50 percent.3 52 When used in
conjunction with the SONAR, which considers dynamic risk factors,3 53 the risk
assessment accuracy is further increased. 354 The combined assessments should capture
short-term, intermediate, and long-term risk factors associated with sexual recidivism.
355
As currently utilized, these tools help the Department of Corrections determine the
appropriate treatment and supervision during probation and parole based on the
individual sex offender's risk, needs, and responsiveness.
3 56
Although sex offenders are more likely to be re-arrested for a sex crime,35 7 this
risk is relatively low and most do not re-offend.35 8 Contrary to popular opinion, repeat
offenders do not commit the majority of sex crimes. 359 Classifying an offender's risk
level based solely on the convicted offense is insufficient evidence of risk to the
public.360 Researchers have developed and fine-tuned risk assessment tools based on
empirical evidence and specific factors associated with recidivism. 36 1 Oklahoma already
uses two of these tools to assess sex offenders for probation and parole purposes36 2 and
the State should extend the application of those assessments to assign the statutory risk
levels. The current system that uses only one factor, the offense, to determine the level




349. Id. at 4.
350. Id. at 3.
351. See Harris, supra n. 70, at 38-39.
352. Hanson, supra n. 69, at 70.
353. Harris, supra n. 70, at 39.
354. See Hanson, supra n. 69, at 71.
355. Harris, supra n. 70, at 39.
356. Jones & Okla. Dept. Corrects., supra n. 345, at 4.
357. Langan, Schmitt & Durose, supra n. 2, at 24 tbl. 21.
358. Hanson, supra n. 69, at 64 (within five years, only 13.4 percent recidivated with a new sexual offense;
within 20 years, 30-40 percent may recidivate); No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 4, 27 (75 percent of sex
offenders do not re-offend).
359. No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 4, 25.
360. Hanson, supra n. 69, at 71.
361. Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgt., The Importance of Assessment in Sex Offender Management: An Overview
of Key Principles and Practices, U.S. Dept. Just. 4-5 (July 2007) (available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/
assessment.bief.pdf).
362. Jones & Okla. Dept. Corrects., supra n. 345, at 3.
363. See Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgt., supra n. 361, at 5 (It is a mistake to rely on a single source of
information to assess risk.).
364. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C) ("various factors").
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As implemented in Oklahoma, 78 percent of the registered sex offenders were
assigned to level three, three percent to level two, and 19 percent to level one. 365 In
other words, 78 percent of the offenders were deemed a "serious danger to the
community and will continue to engage in criminal sexual conduct."36 6 These ratios
inaccurately reflect the risk to children or to the public in general because the majority of
sex offenders do not re-offend.3 67 "The least number of people should be in the worst
tier"368 and not the other way around.369  The state legislators intended individual
assessments be used to determine risk so law enforcement could focus their time and
resources on the offenders who are the biggest threat to the public. 3 70 Instead, assigning
risk based solely on the offense resulted in classifications that are inaccurate and too
broad.37 1 The Department of Corrections should apply the tools the state already uses in
probation and parole to determine the individual sex offender's statutory risk level.
Based on an individualized risk assessment as outlined above, level one sex
offenders should not be subject to the residency restrictions because they are a low threat
to the community and are unlikely to re-offend. 372 It is questionable whether residency
restrictions prevent recidivism and some research indicates the laws may actually make
things worse. 373 If the state continues to use residency restrictions, the law should not
apply to all registered sex offenders, only those likely to re-offend. 374 Law enforcement
would then be able to focus on the offenders who pose a real threat to the community.
375
Individualized risk assessments are stronger on constitutional grounds than
arbitrary classifications based solely on offense. 376  If Oklahoma ties the residency
restrictions to the statutory risk levels, sex offenders will be entitled to procedural
protections under the Due Process Clause. 37 7  Because the risk levels indicate a
corresponding degree of risk to the public, a factual finding of dangerousness is relevant
and the offender should be entitled to a hearing to establish this material fact.37 8 The
statute allows the risk assessment review committee or the court to override an
offender's risk level with proper documentation. 379  This suggests judicial review is
available, and even if this review or hearing does not take place until after the
365. Nicole Marshall, New Sex-Offender Law Faces Opposition, Tulsa World A-I, A-4 (Oct. 28, 2007).
366. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(3).
367. Hanson, supra n. 69, at 64; No Easy Answers, supra n. 287, at 4, 27.
368. Marshall, supra n. 365, at A-4 (quoting Tulsa Police Sgt. Gary Stansill).
369. See id.
370. Mock & Dean, supra n. 117, at 6A.
371. See Marshall, supra n. 365, at A-4.
372. See Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(1).
373. Supra pt. IV (discussing effectiveness of residency restrictions).
374. Marshall, supra n. 365, at A-4.
375. Id.
376. See Weems, 453 F.3d at 1017.
377. Id. at 1019.
378. See Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7-8 (finding of dangerousness was not material under state
law and therefore offender was not entitled to a hearing).
379. Okla, Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(D). But see Rabon, supra n. 334 (committee does not plan to override risk
level). The statute does not specify whether the override can increase or decrease the risk level, but the
Department of Corrections interprets the statute as providing an option only to increase the level. See Okla.
Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(D); Justin Jones & Okla. Dept. Corrects., Operations Memo. No. OP-020307: Sex and
Violent Crime Offender Registration (B) (Nov. 1, 2007) (available at www.doc.state.ok.us/
offtech/op02O307.pdf).
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classification and restrictions are in effect, procedural due process is probably
satisfied. 380 The Due Process Clause does not require all procedural protections be
provided before the initial deprivation of a liberty interest. 38 1 In evaluating a similar
state statute, the Eighth Circuit found that a combination of procedures prior to risk
determination and procedures available after the risk determination satisfied procedural
due process.
382
Oklahoma courts would examine substantive due process challenges using a
rational basis standard because fundamental rights are not implicated. 383 The State's
interest in protecting children and the public from repeat sex offenders 384 would be
better served by applying the residency restrictions only to those offenders who are a
greater risk to the public. 385 The rational relationship between the State's interest and
the laws is strengthened by tying the restrictions to the statutory risk levels.
386
Although residency restrictions have been upheld against ex post facto
arguments, 387 courts are not as unanimous, and strong dissents indicate the possibility
that these laws may eventually be found unconstitutional. 388 When considering whether
the restrictions are so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the legislative intent to
create civil and non-punitive proceedings, the most important factors are whether the law
is rationally related to the state's purpose3 89 and whether the law is excessive in relation
to the state's purpose. 39°  Using individualized risk assessments and imposing
restrictions only on high-risk offenders increases the likelihood that the restrictions are
rationally connected and not excessive in relation to the state's purpose of protecting the
public. 39 1 When based on individualized assessments, the restrictions are on stronger ex
post facto footing.
392
In determining a registered sex offender's numeric risk level, Oklahoma should
follow the statutory language and use individualized risk assessments that take into
consideration multiple factors instead of relying solely on the offense. Furthermore, if
residency restrictions continue to be used in Oklahoma, the restrictions should not apply
to level one sex offenders because by definition, those individuals are deemed unlikely to
re-offend and are a "low danger to the community." 39 3  If, and when, Oklahoma's
residency restrictions are challenged, the laws will more likely be upheld if the
380. See Weems, 453 F.3dat 1019.
381. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981).
382. Weems, 453 F.3dat 1019.
383. Weems, 453 F.3d at 1015; Miller, 405 F.3d at 710-11; Graham, 2006 WL 2645130 at *7; Seering, 701
N.W.2d at 663; Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776-77. See also supra pt. Ill(A) (discussing right to privacy and choice
in family matters, right to travel, and the right to live where one wants).
384. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 581(B).
385. See Marshall, supra n. 365, at A-4.
386. See Weems, 453 F.3dat 1015-16.
387. Supra pt. Ill(B) (discussing ex post facto factors).
388. E.g. Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Seering, 701 N.W.2d
at 671 (Wiggins, J., and Lavorato, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 785
(Kuehn, J., dissenting).
389. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).
390. Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.
391. Weems, 453 F.3dat 1017.
392. Id.
393. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(1).
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394. Supra pt. V (discussing due process and ex post facto challenges).
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